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Unsportsmanlike Conduct: 15-yard Penalty and 
Loss of Free Speech in Public University Sports 
Stadiums* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In March 2005, a University of Kansas (KU) student and his three 
friends traveled to Columbia, Missouri, to watch their beloved Jayhawk 
men’s basketball team take on archrival1 Missouri.2  While this was not 
their first trip to the University of Missouri (MU) to attend an athletic 
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 1. The rivalry between the University of Kansas and the University of Missouri is deeply 
rooted in the days of the American Civil War.  Jonathan Kealing, Anatomy of a Rivalry, LAWRENCE 
J.-WORLD, Nov. 23, 2007, at A1; see Bowen Kerrihard, America’s Civil War: Missouri and Kansas, 
HISTORYNET.COM, http://www.historynet.com/americas-civil-war-missouri-and-kansas.htm/ (last 
visited Mar. 13, 2009).  At the time, Kansas was a territory becoming a strong candidate for 
statehood and a region home to those who favored the abolition of slavery, also known as 
Jayhawkers.  Kerrihard, supra.  On the other side of the border, however, Missouri citizens began to 
fight against the abolitionist movement growing in Kansas and on August 21, 1863, William C. 
Quantrill led 450 of his Missouri followers (Bushwhackers) into Kansas and sacked the City of 
Lawrence.  Id.  “In 120 minutes, they had devastated the dusty town of 2,000 inhabitants and killed 
150 of its male citizens.  Many were gunned down before their wives and children; others died 
trapped in their flaming homes.”  Id.  The fighting continued back and forth until the close of the 
war.  Id.  The rivalry has since carried over to the football field into what is today the second-longest 
rivalry in college football.  Steve Wieberg, ‘Border War’ Stakes High for Missouri, Kansas, USA 
TODAY, Nov. 23, 2007, at 1C.  One popular story in the rivalry occurred in 1950, when the two 
teams met in Columbia, Missouri, to play a game the day after a snowstorm that shut down the entire 
city.  Austin Murphy, They Got Game, SI.COM, Nov. 20, 2007, available at http://sports 
illustrated.cnn.com/2007/football/ncaa/11/20/kansas.missouri1126.  Conditions for the game became 
so frigid that Kansas coaches were forced to ask the Tigers if they had any extra clothing to spare for 
the game.  Id.  Missouri’s equipment manager replied “Hell, no . . . We hope you freeze your asses 
off.”  Id.   So, in order to provide shelter for KU’s players during the game, KU coaches had the 
team bus ram a padlocked gate at the stadium so it could be parked behind the team bench to block 
the wind.  Id.  The rivalry is so intense, that since the 1960 season, the schools have not agreed on 
their official win/loss record.  Rick Dean, KU vs MU—‘Absolutely the Biggest,’ TOPEKA CAP.-J., 
Nov. 23, 2007, at D1.  That year, the Jayhawks were forced to forfeit their 23–7 win and the league 
title after KU used a player during the game who was deemed ineligible to compete after he accepted 
a plane ride from a KU booster the year before.  Id.   
 2. Briefly in Sports: University OK’s Handling of KU Student, TOPEKA CAP.-J., May 25, 2005, 
at D6. 
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event, it was the first time they brought with them a banner to display at 
the game.3  Their six-foot pro-KU banner4 jokingly referenced the 
renaming of Mizzou Arena,5 home to the University of Missouri 
basketball team, with several crossed-out names and the phrase, “Call it 
whatever you want, it’ll always be Allen Fieldhouse East,”6 a reference 
to the hallowed basketball venue in Lawrence, Kansas. 
When the four friends entered the arena, they received permission 
from an arena official to tape their banner to a railing so that it hung from 
the edge of the upper-deck.7  But before the game tipped off, an older 
man in an MU shirt seated near the banner learned of the sign’s existence 
and began removing it from the rail.8  The KU student confronted the 
man and sought to retrieve his banner from the MU fan’s grasp, but was 
surprised when the MU fan grabbed him by the collar of his shirt, drew 
him toward him, and told the KU student that he was the Chief of Police 
of the University of Missouri.9 
Moments later, a uniformed officer arrived on the scene and ejected 
one of the KU fans from the arena after he asserted his free-speech 
rights.10  The KU students filed formal complaints with the university, 
which launched a twelve-week investigation11 and concluded that the 
police chief “acted within his bounds throughout the incident, and that 
                                                          
 3. Phil Ameling, U. Kansas Fan Alleges Mid-Game Assault at U. Missouri, MANEATER (U. of 
Mo.), Mar. 11, 2005. 
 4. Dani Litt, Sign Prompts Tussle, U. DAILY KANSAN, Mar. 9, 2005, at 1A. 
 5. The University of Missouri’s new basketball arena, Mizzou Arena, was originally named 
Paige Sports Arena after Paige Laurie, daughter of billionaires Bill and Nancy Laurie, who donated 
$25 million toward the building campaign.  College Removes Name of Wal-Mart Heiress on Arena, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 24, 2004, available at http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/retail/2004-
11-24-walmart-heiress-arena_x.htm.  However, in 2004, the university changed the name of its arena 
after it was discovered that Paige Laurie paid her college roommate approximately twenty-thousand 
dollars over three and a half years “to write papers and complete other assignments for her.”  Id. 
 6. Ameling, supra note 3.  The banner now hangs on display at The Wheel, a popular 
restaurant in Lawrence, Kansas, and reads in full as follows:  
Norm Stewart Center  
WAL*MART Super Center 
 Paige Sports Arena 
 Mizzou Arena 
 CALL IT WHATEVER YOU WANT, IT WILL ALWAYS BE 
ALLEN FIELDHOUSE EAST 
                                                Always 
  Liz Nartowicz, Mizzou Police Chief Exonerated, U. DAILY KANSAN, June 8, 2005, at 4A.     
 7. Nartowicz, supra note 6. 
 8. Litt, supra note 4. 
 9. Ameling, supra note 3. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Briefly in Sports: University OK’s Handling of KU Student, supra note 2. 
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safety for all fans was his motive for removing the banner.”12  At the 
time, the University of Missouri had no policy concerning signs and 
banners inside Mizzou Arena.13 
For years, fans across the country have attended collegiate athletic 
events, expressing their endless support for a favorite team and 
passionate opposition to their school’s archrival.  This form of 
expression, sometimes referred to as “cheering speech,”14 often is 
directed at “teams, players, coaches, officials, executives, administrators, 
or other fans. . . .  It can be about events on the field or it can target 
broader social and political issues surrounding the game, the players, or 
sport in general.”15  Typically such speech is generated by the student 
section of the home team and it “supports, opposes, cheers, jeers, praises, 
criticizes, heckles, and even taunts” those related to the game.16  Fan 
expression is part of the rich tradition of collegiate athletics, and loyal 
school spirit is “encouraged by the teams, the players, the cheerleaders, 
the band, the scoreboard, and the music blaring over the sound system.”17  
“Cheering speech can be oral, symbolic, or written on signs, banners, 
clothing, and body parts.  It can be in good taste or bad, clean or profane, 
provocative, clever, or otherwise.  And it will be loud and obvious.”18 
Recently, universities across the country have come to realize that 
despite their attempts to welcome only cheers filled with spirit, passion, 
and good sportsmanship at collegiate athletic events, crowd noise 
saturated with offensive, lewd, vulgar, profane, and indecent messages 
has remained.  Some schools have taken steps to combat offensive fan 
expression by regulating the size of signs and banners allowed into the 
game,19 while others have gone further by prohibiting signs and banners 
at school athletic events altogether.20 
 
                                                          
 12. Nartowicz, supra note 6. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Howard M. Wasserman, Cheers, Profanity, and Free Speech, 31 J.C. & U.L. 377, 378 
(2005). 
 15. Id. 
 16. Howard M. Wasserman, Fans, Free Expression, and the Wide World of Sports, 67 U. PITT. 
L. REV. 525, 527–28 (2006). 
 17. Id. at 526. 
 18. Id. at 528. 
 19. See Kelley Tiffany, Cheering Speech at State University Athletic Events: How Do You 
Regulate Bad Spectator Sportsmanship?, 14 SPORTS LAW. J. 111, 118–19 (2007) (discussing 
Mississippi University’s ban against fans bringing in flags and signs larger than twelve by fourteen 
inches). 
 20. Tom Knott, At UVa, Not a Sign of the Times, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2008, at C3 
(discussing the University of Virginia’s ban on all signs at all university athletic events in 2008). 
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But to what extent can any university constitutionally impose 
restrictions as to the size, type, or character of a spectator’s mode of 
expression?  Are full-fledged bans the answer to silencing objectionable 
speech at games or should content-specific restrictions, such as a 
prohibition of “vulgar” language,21 be the solution?  What effect will 
such broad policies have on student cheering speech that is not 
considered profane, indecent, vulgar, or derogatory, but clever, 
humorous, and arguably truthful, such as a sign reading, “I’m blind, I’m 
deaf, I wanna be a ref”22—or the KU student and his banner?  Do 
collegiate sports fans have any First Amendment speech rights when they 
enter public university stadiums and arenas? 
This Comment will examine the ability of public universities to 
effectively regulate student speech at collegiate athletic events in 
accordance with the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment.  Part II 
of this Comment will review the prevalence of offensive fan expression 
in recent years and summarize the history of applicable First Amendment 
case law and doctrines.  Part III will analyze the public forum nature of 
the university football stadium or basketball arena and discuss whether 
public universities may regulate expression within these venues.  Further, 
this Comment will address various proposals to resolve the dispute over 
fan expression and offer critiques as to why such recommendations may 
pass First Amendment scrutiny but fail public opinion.  Finally, this 
Comment will propose an American solution to the fan expression issue 
that will actively acknowledge the aims of the First Amendment—more 
speech, more expression.  Furthermore, it will provide clear and effective 
options for university officials and administrators to create a collegiate 
athletic environment that welcomes families, students, and their 
messages. 
                                                          
 21. The sign policy at the University of Missouri states: 
Items that can be held by one individual, maximum 2’x3’, reflect good sportsmanship, do 
not contain vulgar, derogatory or suggestive language and do not block the view of other 
ticketed patrons may be permitted.  No signs, flags or banners of any size may not [sic] 
be affixed to the facility or any pole or stick.  The Department of Athletics reserves the 
right to remove these items not meeting those specifications. 
MUTigers.com, Football Ticket Policies and Procedures, http://mutigers.cstv.com/tickets/footbl-
policies-procedures.html#7 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 22. In 1998, a University of Kansas student’s sign was confiscated during a KU home 
basketball game because the sign was deemed to be “not in the spirit of good sportsmanship.”  Matt 
Gowen, Foul Called on Sign Removal, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Feb. 21, 1998, available at 
http://www2.ljworld.com/news/1998/feb/21/foul_called_on_sign. 
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II. BACKGROUND 
A. Collegiate Fan Expression Echoes and Offends 
The extent to which fan expression at collegiate sporting events has 
become profane, lewd, and inappropriate has recently been a topic of 
conversation among fans, athletic departments, and school administrators 
who are looking to make the experience fun and enjoyable for both 
students and families.  Several recent examples of controversial fan 
expression are representative of the type that generates these 
conversations.  During a 2004 home basketball game against Duke 
University, students at the University of Maryland—some wearing shirts 
reading “Fuck Duke”23—erupted into a chant of “Fuck You, J.J.!” each 
time Duke guard J.J. Redick approached the foul line.24  At the 
University of Kentucky, students chanted “Matt is gay” at Matt Walsh, a 
member of the visiting University of Florida basketball team.25  In 2003, 
students at the University of Florida taunted Maryland Terrapin guard 
D.J. Strawberry by referring to the drug problems of his father, former 
major league baseball player Darryl Strawberry.26  University of Oregon 
students got in on the action in 2008 during a basketball game against 
conference foe UCLA.  Oregon fans “targeted UCLA player Kevin Love, 
an Oregon high school graduate,” and reduced his grandmother to tears 
in the stands when they chanted “whores” at his family.27 
Rather than using chants and cheers, fans at the Ohio State 
University have adorned t-shirts with the words “Ann Arbor is a Whore,” 
a reference to their rival’s hometown,28 when the university plays the 
University of Michigan Wolverines.  Students at the University of 
                                                          
 23. Evan Davis, Column, ‘F—k Duke’ Shirts Disgrace Maryland Fans, CHRON. (Duke Univ.), 
Jan. 22, 2003, at Sports, available at http://www.dukechronicle.com/home/index.cfm?event= 
displayArticle&ustory_id=8ec8482e-b6cb-4e46-94ff-ffd279bb6752. 
 24. Andrew Goodman, Fans Walk Fine Line with Speech: Vulgarity Raises Freedom of Speech 
Issue for Spectators, THE DAILY PENNSYLVANIAN, Feb. 24, 2004, at Sports, available at http:// 
www.dailypennsylvanian.com/media/storage/paper882/news/2004/02/24/sports/fans-
walk.fine.line.with.speech-2152254.shtml. 
 25. Eric Hoover, Crying Foul Over Fans’ Boorish Behavior: Colleges Try to Rein in Profanity 
at Games Without Violating Free-Speech Rights, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 9, 2004, at A1. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Editorial, When Cheers Turn to Abuse, Colleges Need to Take Action, USA TODAY, Mar. 7, 
2008, at 12A. 
 28. Monica M. Torline, Vendors Must Sell Ann Arbor T-shirts Off OSU Grounds, LANTERN 
(Ohio St. U.), Nov. 16, 2000, at Campus, available at http://media.www.thelantern.com/media/ 
storage/paper333/news/2000/11/16/campus/vendors.must.sell.Ann.Arbor.off.OSU.grounds-
5154.shtml. 
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Kansas for years have sported t-shirts displaying, “Muck Fizzou,”29 a jab 
at the school’s archrival, Mizzou.  In response, Missouri students in 2007 
created a t-shirt displaying a picture of Lawrence, Kansas, burning in 
William Quantrill’s raid of 1863.30  Immediately below the picture 
appeared the word “Scoreboard” and a University of Missouri logo.31  
Finally, using a slightly different approach, students at the University of 
Colorado have inserted the words “Fuck ‘em Up, Fuck ‘em Up, Go 
CU”32 into one of the school’s already controversial fight songs, “Rock 
and Roll (Part 2).”33 
In reaction to what many believe is outrageous fan behavior, some 
schools have taken swift action to clean the stadium air.34  Before the 
start of the 2008 college football season, the University of Virginia put 
into place an all-out ban on signs and banners at the school’s sporting 
events.35  The rule, enacted to “promote sportsmanship and a positive 
game day environment,”36 came almost a year after a University of 
Virginia student brought a sign to Scott Stadium that read “Fire Groh,” 
referring to current University of Virginia football coach Al Groh.37  The 
student was threatened with ejection because his sign was not in 
compliance with the school’s previous sign policy restricting signs of 
derogatory matter, signs containing profanity, or those that impeded 
other fans’ view of the game.38  The student stated afterward, “I wasn’t 
being obscene.  I wasn’t acting inappropriate.  I was just holding a sign 
                                                          
 29. Eric Weslander, Rude Shirts a Disservice to KU Spirit, Group Says, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, 
Mar. 3, 2007, at 1C. 
 30. George Diepenbrock, Quantrill-Themed T-Shirt Stirs Bitter Emotion, LAWRENCE J.-
WORLD, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Buffs.tv, All Colorado Football - All the Time, http://buffs.tv/archives/2002/09/10/fck_em_ 
up_go_cu.html (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 33. Gary Glitter, who won fame as a flamboyant glam rocker in the 1970s for his song “Rock 
and Roll (Part 2),” more popularly known as “The Hey Song,” was convicted in 2006 for committing 
obscene acts with two underage Vietnamese girls.  Nancy Armour, Why Did NFL Muzzle Gary 
Glitter?, B. GLOBE, Sept. 16, 2006, available at http://www.boston.com/news/world/europe/ 
articles/2006/09/16/column_why_did_nfl_muzzle_gary_glitter/.  In 1999, Glitter was convicted in 
Britain for possessing child pornography.  Id.  In response to Glitter’s 2006 conviction, the NFL 
instituted a league-wide ban of the song in all of its stadiums.  Id.  Some universities have also 
banned the song from being played during games.  See, e.g., Gary Bedore, Song Barred from Allen, 
LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Sept. 8, 2006, at 7C (song banned at University of Kansas athletic events). 
 34. See When Cheers Turn to Abuse, Colleges Need to Take Action, supra note 27 (describing 
instances of fan verbal abuse to players, players’ families, and other fans). 
 35. Jeff Christian, Virginia, Here’s a Sign for You, MANASSA J. MESSENGER, Aug. 22, 2008. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
08.0_KAUFMAN FINAL 4/22/2009  9:02:59 AM 
2009] UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 1241 
and expressing an opinion.”39  “The ban was tweaked earlier this year to 
include all signs, the good and the bad”40—a content and viewpoint 
neutral position.  The student section responded during a home game in 
2008 when they held up plain white pieces of paper which said 
nothing—but yet, said everything.41 
Similar restrictions have been imposed at other schools, although not 
to such an extent.  The University of Mississippi imposed a ban on flags 
and banners larger than twelve by fourteen inches at its university 
athletic events.42  The restriction was imposed to prevent injuries from 
flagsticks and address complaints about such items obstructing the views 
of other spectators.43  In a subsequent lawsuit, brought by a student who 
was prohibited from displaying his confederate flag at a school football 
game, a U.S. District Court upheld the ban.44  The court explained that 
the ban’s purpose of safety and control of the spectators within the 
stadium reflected the university’s substantial interest in safe and efficient 
game management.45 
B. A Brief Overview of the Freedom of Speech 
A person’s ability to express himself or herself freely without fear of 
persecution is one of the cornerstones to the First Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.  It directly prohibits Congress from making any law 
“abridging the freedom of speech.”46  Initially, however, the protections 
of the First Amendment were limited, understood to be a strict restriction 
only on the federal government’s ability to regulate individual speech.47  
This left the states free to regulate expression to the extent that their 
respective state constitutions would permit. 
 
                                                          
 39. Brian McNeill, Signs Lead to Trouble: Game Day Commentary Spurs Speech Debate, 
CLOVER HERALD, Sept. 13, 2007. 
 40. Knott, supra note 20. 
 41. Paul Kimbrough, UVA Dropped Ball on Sign Ban, REFLECTOR, Sept. 12, 2008, available at 
http://media.www.reflector-online.com/media/storage/paper938/news/2008/09/12/Sports/Uva-
Dropped.Ball.On.Sign.Ban-3427800.shtml. 
 42. Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A. 397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 
12, 1999). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at *1, *4. 
 45. Id. at *4. 
 46. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 47. See Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247–48, 250 (1833) (holding that the commands of 
the Bill of Rights, specifically the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause, apply only to the federal 
government and place no restriction on the state governments). 
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However, this view slowly changed following the ratification of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, which states that “[n]o State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of 
citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of 
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”48  A series of cases 
following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment began to 
incorporate portions of the Bill of Rights, including the First 
Amendment, through the Due Process Clause, making them enforceable 
against the states.  The Court in Rochin v. California explained that 
“[d]ue process of law is a summarized constitutional guarantee of respect 
for those personal immunities which Mr. Justice Cardozo twice wrote for 
the Court, are ‘so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as 
to be ranked as fundamental.’”49 
Despite this broad application of the First Amendment to both state 
and federal government, the guarantee of free speech is still not 
absolute.50  The Court over time has developed an informal hierarchy of 
protected speech, ranging from the complete protection of a man whose 
jacket read “Fuck the Draft,”51 to prohibiting another man from telling a 
police officer he is “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned Fascist.”52  
In the middle lay all other forms of speech that to some degree may be 
regulated to the extent that such regulation is based upon important 
governmental interests.  It seems, however, the Court will always favor a 







                                                          
 48. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 49. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 169 (1952) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 
97, 105 (1934)). 
 50. See Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987) (holding that the First Amendment only 
protects works where a reasonable person would find the material, as a whole, has “serious literary, 
artistic, political, or scientific value”); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (holding that 
the states can forbid speech that is intended to incite imminent lawless action and is “likely to incite 
or produce such action”); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964) (holding 
that defamation based on actual malice receives no First Amendment protection); Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942) (holding that fighting words receive no First Amendment 
protection). 
 51. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16–17, 19–21 (1971). 
 52. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (holding that fighting words receive no First Amendment 
protection). 
08.0_KAUFMAN FINAL 4/22/2009  9:02:59 AM 
2009] UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 1243 
because we are all best served by a vigorous and open debate.53  In 
Cohen v. California, Justice Harlan wrote: 
The constitutional right of free expression is powerful medicine in a 
society as diverse and populous as ours.  It is designed and intended to 
remove government restraints from the arena of public discussion, 
putting the decision . . . into the hands of each of us, in the hope that 
use of such freedom will ultimately produce a more  capable citizenry 
and more perfect polity and in the belief that no other approach would 
comport with the premise of individual dignity and choice upon which 
our political system rests.54 
1. Unprotected Speech: At the Stadium and on the Street 
At the bottom of the free speech hierarchy are the various forms of 
expression that the Court has determined receive absolutely no protection 
because they lack social value and have little redeeming quality.55  
Within this category of speech, the Court has held that defamation, 
obscenity, fighting words, and the illegal advocacy of imminent lawless 
action will receive zero protection under the First Amendment.56  
However, the more challenging determination for the Court has been 
determining whether various forms of speech fall within one of these 
categories. 
                                                          
 53. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 271–72 (“‘To persuade others to his own point of view, 
the pleader, as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been, or 
are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement.  But the people of this nation have 
ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probability of excesses and abuses, these liberties 
are, in the long view, essential to enlightened opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of 
a democracy.’ . . .  [E]rroneous statement is inevitable in free debate, and . . . it must be protected if 
the freedoms of expression are to have the ‘breathing space’ that they ‘need . . . to survive’ . . . .” 
(quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940))). 
 54. Cohen, 403 U.S. at 24. 
 55. See Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 349 (1974) (defamatory speech about private 
individuals); Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (obscenity); Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 
(speech that incites imminent lawless action); New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (defamatory 
speech made with actual malice); Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 574 (fighting words). 
 56. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 255–57 (1952) (“There are certain well-defined and 
narrowly limited classes of speech, the prevention and punishment of which has never been thought 
to raise any Constitutional problem.  These include the lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, 
and the insulting or ‘fighting’ words . . . [i]t has been well observed that such utterances are no 
essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any 
benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and 
morality.”). 
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a. Defamation of Public and Private Figures 
While different standards exist for establishing defamation of public 
versus private figures,57 the basic premise remains the same: the act of 
harming the reputation of another by making a false statement to a third 
party will not receive protection by the Court.58  For example, the Court 
in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan noted that unpleasant attacks on the 
government and its officials are important aspects of political speech 
which deserve protection, but when a speaker engages in actual malice 
against another, the government is able to regulate.59  But the Court did 
not go so far as to require the absolute truth from speakers either, 
allowing room for mistakes of fact to enter the arena of public dialogue.60  
This stance illustrates the Court’s belief in and desire to promote a rich 
marketplace of ideas.61 
It may be possible for fan expression to be characterized as 
defamation if a specific player, coach, or high-level administrator is the 
target of such expression.  However, most of the cheering speech at issue 
relates to offensive and indecent language rather than harming the 
reputation of a specific individual.  But, because defamation is not 
recognized as a protected form of speech, public universities are free to 
ban such speech at school athletic events. 
b. Obscene Materials 
Obscenity, a form of speech considered socially taboo as a result of 
the depiction of sexually explicit material, also will not receive 
protection under the First Amendment.62  The Court has recognized that 
states have a significant interest in prohibiting the dissemination of 
obscene material, which carries with it a significant danger of offending 
the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to children.63 
                                                          
 57. See New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279–80 (requiring a showing of actual malice); Gertz, 418 
U.S. at 345–46 (holding that states should retain the ability to determine remedies for “defamatory 
falsehood[s] injurious to the reputation of a private individual”). 
 58. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 1999); see also New York Times, 376 U.S. at 
283; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 345–46. 
 59. New York Times, 376 U.S. at 283. 
 60. Id. at 279. 
 61. See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 341 (“The First Amendment requires that we protect some falsehood 
in order to protect speech that matters.”). 
 62. See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973). 
 63. Id. at 18–19 (“This Court has recognized that the States have a legitimate interest in 
prohibiting dissemination or exhibition of obscene material when the mode of dissemination carries 
with it a significant danger of offending the sensibilities of unwilling recipients or of exposure to 
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While the general prohibition on obscenity seems clear-cut, the 
Court has struggled in determining what standards should be used to 
measure obscenity in the community.  That standard was clarified by the 
Court in Miller v. California.64  The Court adopted the following three-
part test for determining obscenity: (1) a reasonable person applying 
community standards thinks the work applies to a prurient interest; (2) 
the work depicts sexual conduct (defined by state law); and (3) the work 
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.65 
To the extent fan expression at collegiate sporting events reaches the 
level of obscenity, universities remain free to impose strict regulations 
prohibiting such content inside their stadiums.  But college sports fans 
are bringing profane and offensive signs and banners into games, not 
images of pornography.  Fans are chanting and yelling indecent and 
vulgar remarks in unison, not engaging in sexual conduct in the stands.  
Thus, the recognized prohibition of obscenity hardly seems relevant in 
college stadiums and arenas. 
c. Fighting Words 
Another form of speech the Court has held receives no protection is 
fighting words—“those which by their very utterance inflict injury or 
tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.”66  This form of 
expression includes “those personally abusive epithets which, when 
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, 
inherently likely to provoke violent reaction.”67  In Chaplinsky v. New 
Hampshire, the defendant, a Jehovah’s Witness, was convicted of 
violating a state law criminalizing the use of offensive speech when he 
called a police officer “a God damned racketeer” and “a damned 
Fascist.”68  The Chaplinsky court held that the test of fighting words “is 
not to be defined in terms of what a particular addressee thinks[, but] 
what men of common intelligence would understand would be words 
likely to cause an average addressee to fight.”69 
While initially this doctrine is tempting for proponents of regulation 
of fan expression to use in support of their position, it is important to 
note that since Chaplinsky was decided in 1942, the Court has gone 
                                                                                                                       
juveniles.”). 
 64. 413 U.S. 15 (1973). 
 65. Id. at 24–25. 
 66. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). 
 67. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). 
 68. Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 569. 
 69. Id. at 573. 
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sixty-seven years without basing a decision on the “fighting words” 
doctrine.70  During that time, the Court has chosen to construe the 
doctrine narrowly whenever the occasion to address it has arisen.71 
d. Illegal Advocacy 
First Amendment protections will also not be overcome if an 
individual simply advocates violating the law.72  As the Court explained 
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, such speech will remain lawful unless (1) the 
advocacy is intentionally directed to inciting imminent lawless action 
and (2) the speaker’s actions are likely to produce such action.73  In 
Brandenburg, the defendant was prosecuted for advocating the 
commission of various crimes.74  A videotape recording showed him 
leading Ku Klux Klan members and suggesting an overthrow of the 
government.75  The Court held the statute in question, which purported to 
forbid and punish mere advocacy of a defined type of action, to be 
unconstitutional.76 
It is unlikely that fan expression at college sporting events will ever 
be considered under this category of speech.  To the extent rowdy 
student sections begin unison chants intentionally directed at inciting 
imminent lawless action, and which are also likely to produce such 
action, the university may take action.  But this scenario is not likely to 
occur, except possibly when a student begins advocating for the student 
section to tear down the goal posts following a football game. 
2. Speech Subject to Government Regulation 
At the top of the free speech hierarchy—receiving ultimate 
protection from the Supreme Court—is political speech; a form of 
expression that Justice Cardozo would likely argue is “rooted in the 
traditions and conscience of [the] people.”77  But over time, even 
protected forms of speech have been subject to First Amendment 
scrutiny, especially when (1) such expression becomes intertwined with 
                                                          
 70. Stephen R. McAllister, Funeral Picketing Laws and Free Speech, 55 U. KAN. L. REV. 575, 
591 (2007). 
 71. Id. 
 72. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 449 (1969). 
 73. Id. at 447. 
 74. Id. at 444–45. 
 75. Id. at 445–47. 
 76. Id. at 449. 
 77. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934). 
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offensive language and conduct, (2) the listeners are a captive audience, 
or (3) the speakers are students in a school classroom. 
a. Offensive Words and Conduct 
The Court in Cohen v. California recognized that offensive words 
and profanity are “necessary side effects of the broader enduring values 
which the process of open debate permits us to achieve. . . . Surely the 
State has no right to cleanse public debate to the point where it is 
grammatically palatable to the most squeamish among us.”78  
Furthermore, the Court noted that freedom of speech is “powerful 
medicine,”79 and words are often chosen as much for their emotional 
force as their cognitive strength.80  The Court has indicated that it does 
not want to decide the value and relative emotive function of all profane 
words for society because they “may often be the more important 
element of the overall message sought to be communicated.”81 
In Cohen, the defendant walked into a county courthouse wearing a 
jacket bearing the words “Fuck the Draft” as a means of informing the 
public of his feelings against the Vietnam War.82  People were present 
throughout the corridor, including children, when the defendant entered, 
but neither the defendant nor anyone in the public committed or 
threatened to commit any act of violence.83  In fact, there was no 
evidence the defendant “uttered any sound prior to his arrest.”84  The 
Court, in reversing the defendant’s breach of the peace conviction, 
differentiated the speaker’s expression in the courthouse from the 
“fighting words” speech found in Chaplinsky by focusing on the reaction 
of the receiver of the speech.85  “No individual actually or likely to be 
present could reasonably have regarded the words on appellant’s jacket 
as a direct personal insult.”86 
The interaction between speech and conduct can pose an even more 
difficult question for the Court.  While sometimes the distinction 
between the two is clear for appropriate and lawful governmental 
                                                          
 78. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971). 
 79. Id. at 24. 
 80. Id. at 26. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 16. 
 83. Id. at 16–17. 
 84. Id. at 17. 
 85. Id. at 20. 
 86. Id. 
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regulation,87 in other instances they seem to blend into one message.  
This combination, referred to as “symbolic speech” by the defendant in 
United States v. O’Brien,88 requires special consideration.  To the extent 
such speech and non-speech elements are combined in the same course 
of conduct, “a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating 
the non-speech element can justify incidental limitations on First 
Amendment freedoms.”89 
In O’Brien, the defendants publicly burned their Selective Service 
draft cards on the steps of a Boston courthouse in an effort to influence 
others to adopt their anti-war beliefs.90  Having been charged with 
destroying their draft cards,91 the defendants argued that the act of 
burning their draft certificates was symbolic speech, a protected mode of 
communication by conduct under the First Amendment.92  But the Court 
held that “government regulation is sufficiently justified if it . . . furthers 
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental 
interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the 
incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater 
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.”93  It explained that 
Congress had a legitimate and substantial interest in preventing the 
destruction of the draft certificates because the “[n]ation has a vital 
interest in having a system for raising armies that functions with 
maximum efficiency and is capable of easily and quickly responding to 
continually changing circumstances.”94 
Similarly, in Texas v. Johnson, the defendant was convicted of 
desecrating a venerated object after he doused an American flag with 
kerosene and set it on fire outside of city hall in Dallas, Texas, as part of 
a group protest against the policies of the Reagan administration.95  In 
holding the state law unconstitutional for being content and viewpoint 
based, the Court reiterated its “bedrock principle” underlying the First 
Amendment by stating that “government may not prohibit the expression 
of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or 
                                                          
 87. See, e.g., Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (holding that 
the National Park Service’s regulation prohibiting camping on the National Mall did not violate the 
First Amendment). 
 88. 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. at 369–70. 
 91. Id. 
 92. Id. at 376. 
 93. Id. at 377. 
 94. Id. at 381. 
 95. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 399–400 (1989). 
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disagreeable.”96  The Court refused to permit certain symbols to be used 
to communicate only a limited set of messages and instead urged that the 
appropriate remedy is more speech—to protest the protestors rather than 
enforce silence.97  “[The Court] can imagine no more appropriate 
response to burning a flag than waving one’s own, no better way to 
counter a flag burner’s message than by saluting the flag that 
burns . . . .”98 
b. Captive Audience 
The captive audience doctrine represents the notion that speech may 
be restricted when the listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from 
the intrusive speech of another.99  In applying the principle, the Court 
must be careful to balance free expression with its interest in protecting 
those who essentially become prisoners of potentially rude, indecent, and 
profane expression.  The Court has recognized, for example, its 
significant interest in protecting an individual’s right to privacy within 
his or her home, and that this interest plainly outweighs the First 
Amendment rights of an intruder.100  Justice O’Connor, in her Frisby v. 
Schultz opinion, wrote: 
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the 
unwilling listener.  Although in many locations, we expect individuals 
to simply avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is 
different. . . .  Instead, a special benefit of the privacy all citizens enjoy 
within their own walls . . . is an ability to avoid intrusions.  Thus, we 
have repeatedly held that individuals are not required to welcome  
 
 
                                                          
 96. Id. at 414. 
 97. Id. at 419–20. 
 98. Id. at 420. 
 99. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 224 (8th ed. 1999); see also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 
474, 484–85 (1988) (holding that individuals are not required to welcome unwanted speech into their 
homes); Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210–11 (1975) (holding that government cannot 
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offensive to require protection for 
those unwilling viewers standing outside of a drive-in movie theater with a view of the screen 
depicting scenes of female nudity); Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) 
(holding that a city may prohibit political advertisements from being displayed within its transit 
system because the passengers of the system are a captive audience). 
 100. See Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484–85 (1988) (“One important aspect of residential 
privacy is protection of the unwilling listener.”); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978) 
(“Patently offensive, indecent material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in 
public, but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to be left alone plainly 
outweighs the First Amendment rights of an intruder.”  (citing Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 
728 (1970))). 
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unwanted speech into their own homes and that the government may 
protect this freedom.101 
Beyond the confines of one’s dwelling, the Court has remained 
diligent in protecting the unwilling ears of captive listeners and viewers.  
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, the Court deemed passengers of a 
city transit system to be a captive audience after a politician sought to 
promote his candidacy for public office by utilizing advertising space in 
the city’s streetcars.102  In upholding the city’s prohibition on political 
advertisements in its streetcars, the Court stated that “the nature of the 
forum and the conflicting interests involved have remained important in 
determining the degree of protection afforded by the Amendment to the 
speech in question.”103  The Court noted that “the city is engaged in 
commerce. . . .  [A] city transit system has discretion to develop and 
make reasonable choices concerning the type of advertising that may be 
displayed in its vehicles.”104  It reasoned that to allow political 
propaganda would leave “lurking doubts about favoritism” and result in 
“sticky administrative problems . . . in parceling out limited space to 
eager politicians.”105 
However, the Court in Cohen considered application of the captive 
audience doctrine to whether the defendant’s “Fuck the Draft” message 
subjected unwilling viewers to his profane message such that they would 
be unable to escape from its offensive nature.106  The argument was made 
that the defendant’s “mode of expression was thrust upon unwilling or 
unsuspecting viewers” and thus the State should act “to protect the 
sensitive from otherwise unavoidable exposure to [the defendant’s] crude 
form of protest.”107  The Court explained, however, that “the mere 
presumed presence of unwitting listeners or viewers does not serve 
automatically to justify curtailing all speech capable of giving 
offense. . . .  Those in the Los Angeles courthouse could effectively 
avoid further bombardment of their sensibilities simply by averting their 
eyes.”108 
This same rationale was followed by the Court in Erznoznik v. City 
of Jacksonville, where the manager of a drive-in movie theater was 
                                                          
 101. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484–85 (citations omitted). 
 102. Lehman, 418 U.S. at 299–302. 
 103. Id. at 302–03. 
 104. Id. at 303. 
 105. Id. at 304. 
 106. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971). 
 107. Id. at 21. 
 108. Id. 
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charged with violating a municipal ordinance for showing a motion 
picture depicting female nudity because the screen was visible from 
public streets.109  In holding the municipal ordinance to be invalid, the 
Court explained that “the Constitution does not permit government to 
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently 
offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer.  
Rather, . . . the burden normally falls upon the viewer to ‘avoid further 
bombardment of [his] sensibilities simply by averting [his] eyes.’”110 
c. Student Speech at the Schoolhouse and on Campus 
The issue of whether free speech and expression rights are available 
to those within a State’s public school system was explored in Tinker v. 
Des Moines Independent Community School District, where the Supreme 
Court recognized that neither “students [n]or teachers shed their 
constitutional rights to freedom of speech or expression at the 
schoolhouse gate.”111  In Tinker, a group of high school students was sent 
home from school because they wore black armbands to class in an effort 
to “publicize their objections to the hostilities in Vietnam.”112  The 
students’ actions were in violation of a school policy prohibiting the 
display of such armbands at school.113 
In evaluating the school’s regulation in Tinker, the Court noted that 
for a state sponsored school to justify a prohibition of expression of 
opinion, “it must be able to show that its action was caused by something 
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that 
always accompany an unpopular viewpoint.”114  The Court continued: 
School officials do not possess absolute authority over their students.  
Students in school as well as out of school are “persons” under our 
Constitution.  They are possessed of fundamental rights which the State 
must respect, just as they themselves must respect their obligations to 
the State. . . .  [Students] may not be confined to the expression of those 
sentiments that are officially approved.115 
 
                                                          
 109. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 206 (1975). 
 110. Id. at 210–11 (alteration in original) (quoting Cohen, 403 U.S. at 21). 
 111. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
 112. Id. at 504. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 509. 
 115. Id. at 511. 
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The Court held that a student may express his or her opinions “in the 
cafeteria, or on the playing field, or on the campus during the authorized 
hours,” so long as the student “does so without ‘materially and 
substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate discipline 
in the operation of the school’ and without colliding with the rights of 
others.”116  If a student disrupts class-work or substantially invades the 
rights of others, the student is not “immunized by the constitutional 
guarantee of freedom of speech.”117 
But in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, the Court limited the 
right of student expression in public schools.118  In Fraser, a high school 
student delivered a speech to a school assembly in which he referred to a 
candidate for student elective office “in terms of an elaborate, graphic, 
and explicit sexual metaphor.”119  Afterwards, the student was informed 
that his speech was in violation of a school policy prohibiting the use of 
obscene language in the school and that he was suspended.120  The Court 
contrasted this conduct from that in Tinker, stating that the penalties 
imposed in Fraser were unrelated to any political viewpoint: 
The First Amendment does not prevent the school officials from 
determining that to permit a vulgar and lewd speech . . . would 
undermine the school’s basic educational mission.  A high school 
assembly or classroom is no place for a sexually explicit monologue 
directed towards an unsuspecting audience of teenage students.  
Accordingly, it was perfectly appropriate for the school to dissociate 
itself to make the point to the pupils that vulgar speech and lewd 
conduct is wholly inconsistent with the “fundamental values” of public 
school education.121 
But to what extent do the holdings in Tinker and Fraser apply to 
public schools of higher education and the regulation of speech on a 
college campus?  The Court addressed this issue in its Papish v. Board of 
Curators of the University of Missouri122 opinion.  In Papish, a university 
graduate student was expelled for distributing a newspaper on campus 
that contained a cartoon depiction of “policemen raping the Statue of 
                                                          
 116. Id. at 512–13 (alteration in original) (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th 
Cir. 1966)). 
 117. Id. 
 118. Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 677–78 (1986). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Id. at 678. 
 121. Id. at 685–86. 
 122. 410 U.S. 667 (1973). 
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Liberty and the Goddess of Justice.”123  The caption under the image 
read, “‘With Liberty and Justice for All.’”124  The paper also contained 
an article entitled “‘M[other] F[ucker] Acquitted,’” in reference to the 
trial “of a New York City youth who was a member of an organization 
known as ‘Up Against the Wall, M[other] F[ucker].’”125  In protecting 
the student’s speech, the Court noted “that the mere dissemination of 
ideas—no matter how offensive to good taste—on a state university 
campus may not be shut off in the name alone of ‘conventions of 
decency.’”126 
The Court’s per curiam opinion in Papish relied on its prior decision 
in Healy v. James,127 a case where the Court held that “state colleges and 
universities are not enclaves immune from the sweep of the First 
Amendment.”128  In Healy, a group of students at a state college sought 
official recognition from the school of their student “leftist” 
organization,129 but the President of the school declined the group’s 
application—a decision which would deprive the members of the 
opportunity to place announcements in the school newspaper or on 
school bulletin boards, and of the use of campus facilities for holding 
meetings—because he thought the “organization’s philosophy was 
antithetical to the school’s policies.”130  In reversing the district court’s 
dismissal of the action, the Court explained: 
[T]his Court has long recognized “the need for affirming the 
comprehensive authority of the States and of school officials, consistent 
with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to prescribe and control 
conduct in the schools.”  Yet, the precedents of this Court leave no 
room for the view that . . . First Amendment protections should apply 
with less force on college campuses than in the community at large.  
Quite to the contrary, “[t]he vigilant protections of constitutional 
freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the community of American 
schools.”  The college classroom . . . is peculiarly the “‘marketplace of 
ideas,’” and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this 
Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.131 
 
                                                          
 123. Id. at 667. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 667–68. 
 126. Id. at 670. 
 127. 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
 128. Id. at 180. 
 129. Id. at 172. 
 130. Id. at 174–76. 
 131. Id. at 180–81 (citations omitted). 
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Since the Court has recognized that the guarantees of the First 
Amendment apply to students in university classes and on college 
campuses, does it seem logical that those same protections should extend 
to the university football stadium and basketball arena?  How similar 
must the university classrooms of the weekday be to the student sections 
on the weekends?  To what extent are the educational missions of the 
universities active when classes are in recess? 
C. Time, Place, and Manner: The Public Forum Analysis 
Whether the right to free speech granted by the First Amendment 
reaches sports fans in the bleachers at collegiate sports venues initially 
will depend on the ownership of the sports venue.  For private schools 
like Notre Dame, Harvard, and Duke, the regulation of speech by school 
administrators can be accomplished with greater ease than their public 
school counterparts.  This is because the facilities of the Fighting Irish, 
the Crimson, and the Blue Devils are not state property, but privately 
owned.  Thus, the private schools can regulate the expression of fans 
with greater freedom as private owners.132  In contrast, the stadiums and 
arenas at public universities are bound by the commands of the 
Constitution through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.133 
But, it is insufficient that government simply “owns the property [at 
issue]—rather, the test is whether the property is of a type that has 
traditionally been used as a forum for expression.”134  The existence of a 
right to access public property and limits upon such a right must be 
evaluated by differing standards, “depending on the character of the 
property at issue.”135  The Supreme Court in Perry Education Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n identified three classifications of 
governmental property136 and described the extent to which a state may 
regulate speech for each designation. 
                                                          
 132. See Louis M. Benedict & John D. McMillen, Free Expression Versus Prohibited Speech: 
The First Amendment and College Student Sports Fans, 15 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 5, 15 (2005) 
(“[S]tate colleges and universities are subject to the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment.”). 
 133. See Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 547 (1975) (“[T]he Fourteenth 
Amendment has made applicable to the States the First Amendment’s guarantee of free speech.”). 
 134. McAllister, supra note 70, at 595. 
 135. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983). 
 136. Id. at 45–46. 
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1. Traditional Public Fora 
The Court in Perry noted that on one side of the public fora spectrum 
are the streets, sidewalks,137 and parks, “which ‘have immemorially been 
held in trust for the use of the public and . . . have been used for purposes 
of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing 
public questions.’”138  This first category represents the “quintessential 
public forum[],” a place “which by long tradition or by government fiat 
[has] been devoted to assembly and debate.”139 
However, despite the historical preservation of speech, these 
traditional public fora are not immune from regulation.  As Justice Butler 
wrote in the Court’s opinion of Hague v. Committee for Industrial 
Organization: 
The privilege of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and 
parks for communication of views . . . may be regulated in the interest 
of all . . . and must be exercised in subordination to the general comfort 
and convenience, and in consonance with peace and good order; but it 
must not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.140 
Content-based restrictions, including an absolute prohibition on a 
particular type of expression, by the state must survive strict scrutiny: the 
state “must show that [enforcement of] its regulation is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest and that [the regulation] is narrowly 
[tailored] to achieve that [interest].”141  Furthermore, the state may also 
enforce content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions on 
expression that “are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of 
communication.”142 
2. Limited Public Fora 
The second forum classification, limited public fora, “consists of 
public property which the state has opened for use by the public as a 
                                                          
 137. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 183–84 (1983) (holding that the government 
cannot prohibit the display of “signs, banners or devices on the public sidewalks surrounding the 
[Supreme Court] building,” but may subject the sidewalks to reasonable time, place, and manner 
restrictions). 
 138. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Hague v. Comm. for Indust. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939). 
 141. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 142. Id. 
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place for expressive activity,”143 but which has not traditionally been an 
area open for expression.  In this forum, the state is not required to allow 
individuals to engage in expression because it “retains the option of 
closing the forum entirely, rather than adopting valid time, place, and 
manner regulations.”144  An example of this forum category is public 
school facilities, which in the evening and on weekends are open for 
groups to assemble, but during the weekday are closed to public 
expression for the education of children.145 
A state is not required to retain the open character of these limited or 
designated public forums, but as long as it does, “it is bound by the same 
standards that apply in a traditional public forum.”146  Thus, “‘the 
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a 
speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an otherwise 
includible subject.’”147  The state may enforce content-neutral time, 
place, and manner restrictions on expression that are “narrowly tailored 
to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”148 
3. Nonpublic Fora 
The third classification is the non-public forum—public property that 
is not by tradition a forum for public communication,149 such as 
government offices, airports,150 or city-operated transit vehicles.151  It is 
here that a state may reserve the forum for its intended purposes and 
restrict public expression because it, like a private owner of property, has 
the “‘power to preserve the property under its control for the use to 
                                                          
 143. Id. 
 144. McAllister, supra note 70, at 596. 
 145. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 386–88 (1993) 
(holding that a school district’s refusal to grant a church group access to school premises solely 
because the group wanted to show a religious film violated the First Amendment); Good News Club 
v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102–03 (2001) (holding that a “school’s exclusion of a Christian 
children’s club from meeting after hours at school based on its religious nature was unconstitutional 
viewpoint discrimination”). 
 146. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 147. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 806 (1985)). 
 148. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. 
 149. Id. at 46. 
 150. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 672, 680–81 (1992) 
(holding that an airport terminal is a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes). 
 151. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 298, 304 (1974) (holding that a city’s 
transit system is a nonpublic forum for First Amendment purposes). 
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which it is lawfully dedicated.’”152  The Perry court noted, “[w]e have 
recognized that the ‘First Amendment does not guarantee access to 
property simply because it is owned or controlled by the 
government.’”153  Thus, in addition to time, place, and manner 
restrictions in these non-public fora, the challenged regulation need only 
be reasonable, as long as it is not an effort to suppress speech that the 
government opposes.154 
In Perry, the Court determined that a school’s internal mail facilities 
fell under the third classification as a non-public forum.155  Because the 
mail system was not open to the public and permission for access to the 
system was not provided indiscriminately by the school principal, 
selective access to the mail system for outside organizations did not 
transform the government property into a public forum.156 
III. REGULATING FAN EXPRESSION AT COLLEGIATE SPORTS VENUES 
A. Collegiate Sports Venues: Limited Public Fora 
The question now becomes, which classification ought to apply to a 
collegiate sports venue?  To make this determination, it is important to 
consider first, who owns the property and second, if owned by the 
government, the purposes to which these spaces have traditionally been 
devoted.  Because this Comment focuses explicitly on the regulation of 
sports venues at public colleges and universities, it is already established 
that the stadiums and arenas at issue are governmental property of the 
state in which they are located. 
The question then becomes, for what purposes have collegiate sports 
venues traditionally been devoted with regard to expression?  Clearly, 
the primary purpose of such venues is to offer a facility suitable to host 
athletic events for both teams to compete, but also for the general public 
to attend, observe, and participate in the event through expression.  
However, access to these venues is not completely open to the public like 
a sidewalk or town square might be.  Rather, football stadiums are 
packed with screaming fanatics on only a handful of Saturdays each  
 
                                                          
 152. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’n, 453 
U.S. 114, 130 (1981)). 
 153. Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv., 453 U.S. at 129). 
 154. Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, 505 U.S. at 679. 
 155. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
 156. Id. at 47. 
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season; throughout the vast majority of the rest of the year, public access 
is restricted. 
For this reason, it is quite likely that collegiate sports venues do not 
rise to the level of the open public forum such as a street, sidewalk, or 
public park.  Stadiums and arenas are made available to public access 
only for limited amounts of time and for limited purposes.  Furthermore, 
fans must purchase a ticket in order to gain admission to the venue.  
Stadiums also have not traditionally been a location which has 
“‘immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public . . . for 
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and 
discussing public questions.’”157 
However, stadiums and arenas are clearly fora for expressive 
activity.  Before, during, and after games, those in attendance routinely 
participate in university-sponsored rituals and traditions, often led by the 
cheerleaders, the marching band, or scoreboard operators, who 
encourage thousands to clap, chant, sing, and yell together in unison.  At 
Texas A&M University, this type of school spirit is such a force that the 
fans at Kyle Field have come to be known as the “Twelfth Man”158 for 
their influence in creating a hostile playing environment for opposing 
teams.  Additionally, fans frequently take it upon themselves to create 
cheers and chants at athletic events to help motivate their team.  Student 
sections are notorious for their creativity and indecency, but they are also 
the source of commonplace yells across the country such as “De-Fense,” 
“Over-rated,” and “Air-ball.” 
Because universities intentionally invite fans to fill their stadiums 
with noise, spirit, and similar expressive activity, and have traditionally 
done so, collegiate sports venues must be considered limited public fora 
for First Amendment purposes.159  Thus, so long as the government 
keeps sports stadiums and arenas open for cheering speech, the 
government may impose restrictions on speech that are content-neutral  
 
                                                          
 157. Id. at 45 (quoting Hague v. Comm. for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515 (1989)). 
 158. Texas A&M University Traditions Council, http://traditions.tamu.edu/traditions (last visited 
Mar. 13, 2009) (“The entire student body at A&M is the Twelfth Man, and they stand during the 
entire game to show their support . . . .  The 12th Man tradition exists also in musical form; the 
student body sings ‘The Twelfth Man’ after each game in which the Aggies are outscored.”). 
 159. See Clay Calvert & Robert D. Richards, Fans and the First Amendment: Cheering and 
Jeering in College Sports, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 1, 15 (2004) (“[A] venue dedicated to speech 
activities, indeed may result in the finding of a limited public forum.  These facilities are typically 
held open to expressive activities, arguably creating the tradition of speech . . . .”); Wasserman, 
supra note 14, at 386–87 (“The stadium grandstand should be understood as a limited designated 
public forum for fans and for cheering speech.”); Wasserman, supra note 16, at 532 (“[T]he 
bleachers form a designated public forum for fans and for cheering speech.”). 
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and narrowly tailored to further significant governmental interests, but it 
must “leave open ample alternative channels of communication.”160 
Some scholars argue, however, that despite the rowdy, boisterous, 
and noisy environment present inside a collegiate sports venue, such 
locations are non-public fora, subject to reasonable government 
regulation.161  They argue that “state owned or operated property does 
not become a public forum simply because the public is allowed to come 
and go at will.”162  University facilities are dedicated for the educational 
purposes of students and thus restrictions within the stadiums ought to be 
similar to those imposed within the classrooms across the street.163  In 
further support of this position, they have provided the following 
rationale: 
[T]he underlying purpose of college athletics is to provide an 
extracurricular educational experience for student athletes.  The 
educational mission of the school is advanced by encouraging 
sportsmanlike behavior for the student athletes and fans alike.  Thus, it 
is  clearly reasonable to have regulations that attempt to maintain a 
civil environment for college athletics from both a participant and fan 
perspective.164 
While university facilities are dedicated for the educational purposes 
of students, and schools ought to have an obligation to promote 
sportsmanship among those who attend their institution, government 
restrictions must not discriminate on the basis of viewpoint.165  As 
explained below, schools can encourage, but they cannot force; they can 
attempt, but they cannot command compliance with what the school 
believes ought to be appropriate expressive behavior. 
B. Restrictions on Fan Expression as Time, Place, and Manner 
Regulations 
If collegiate sports venues are limited public fora for First 
Amendment purposes, all government regulation of fan expression or 
cheering speech will be subject to constitutional scrutiny.  However, to 
                                                          
 160. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry 
Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983)). 
 161. Benedict & McMillen, supra note 132, at 19 (“It is in this third category of public property 
that collegiate athletic sports venues fall for purposes of First Amendment free speech analysis.”). 
 162. Id. at 20. 
 163. See id. 
 164. Id. at 21–22. 
 165. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 106–07 (2001). 
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the extent all-out, content-neutral bans on such expression are imposed at 
collegiate sports venues, fans literally will have nothing to say because 
such restrictions on expression are constitutional.  As of yet, no 
university has imposed an all-out ban of speech at college sporting 
events, and it is highly unlikely any school would ever venture that far.  
To do so and remain within the bounds of constitutional standards, all 
forms of expression would be suppressed and the stadiums of college 
football would be more like the fairways of professional golf in terms of 
spectator participation. 
But some schools have made an attempt to censor sports fans’ visual 
expression by restricting signs and banners from college sports venues.  
A brief survey of sign and banner policies at schools in the Big XII 
Conference, for example, reveals a variety of differing expression 
restrictions that likely fall well short of constitutional standards.  The 
University of Missouri permits signs that can be held by one individual, 
reflect good sportsmanship, and do not contain vulgar, derogatory, or 
suggestive language.166  At the University of Colorado, fans are informed 
that “[h]and-held signs, banners, or flags that obstruct, endanger, or are 
offensive to other patrons will be confiscated.”167  At both Iowa State 
University and Kansas State University, all banners, placards, and 
leaflets not pre-approved by the athletics department are prohibited from 
school stadiums.168  These restrictions are not content-neutral bans of all 
signs, banners, and placards—rather, they ban only those signs, banners, 
and placards that are either vulgar, derogatory, suggestive, offensive, or 
that are not pre-approved, likely based upon similar standards.  Because 
these regulations are content and viewpoint based, there is no need even 
to apply the strict scrutiny standard.  If challenged, these policies likely 
would be held unconstitutional. 
Other schools, however, have imposed content and viewpoint neutral 
restrictions on visual speech.  The policy adopted by the University of 
Virginia, banning all signs and banners to promote sportsmanship and a 
positive game day environment,169 qualifies.  So too does the University 
                                                          
 166. University of Missouri, Football Ticket Policies and Procedures, http://mutigers.cstv.com/ 
tickets/footbl-policies-procedures.html#7 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 167. University of Colorado, Folsom Field Policies and Information, http://www.cubuffs.com/ 
ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=600&DB_OEM_ID=600&ATCLID=24436 (last visited Mar. 1, 
2009). 
 168. Iowa State University, Jack Trice Stadium Policies and Procedures,  
http://www.cyclones.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10700&key=ATCLID=508900 (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2009); Kansas State University, Gameday Policies, http://www.kstatesports.com/ 
ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=400&KEY=&ATCLID=35616 (last visited Mar. 1, 2009). 
 169. See Christian, supra note 35. 
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of Mississippi’s ban on all flags and banners larger than twelve by 
fourteen inches, imposed to foster safety and eliminate the potential to 
obstruct the view of other spectators.170  But to pass the strict scrutiny 
test, these restrictions on visual cheering speech at collegiate sports 
venues must be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental 
interest and leave open alternative channels of communication. 
1. Significant Governmental Interests at College Stadiums 
In order to constitutionally regulate expression at a limited public 
forum, the government may impose content-neutral time, place, and 
manner restrictions that are narrowly tailored to serve a significant 
governmental interest.  Proponents of speech regulation at collegiate 
sports venues argue that the government has significant interests in (1) 
protecting children from indecent language,171 (2) protecting the privacy 
interests of those watching or listening to the game from home,172 and (3) 
protecting fans from unsafe and hazardous environments.173 
a. Governmental Interest in Protecting the Well-Being of Minors 
Proponents first contend that, because of the high probability that 
children in the stands will be subjected to such language during games, 
universities have a justifiable interest in protecting children at collegiate 
athletic events from offensive language.174  They cite to Ginsberg v. New 
York175 to argue that speech regulation should be justified in terms of 
protecting the “well-being” of minors.176  In Ginsberg, the Court held 
that a New York statute prohibiting the sale of sexually explicit 
material—deemed obscene for minors—to children under seventeen 
                                                          
 170. See Tiffany, supra note 19, at 119. 
 171. Calvert & Richards, supra note 159, at 18 (“[P]ublic universities instituting content-based 
restrictions on spectator expression at sports events should attempt to justify them in terms of 
protecting the well-being of minors in the audience . . . from offensive language.”); Gregory 
Matthew Jacobs, Comment, Curbing Their Enthusiasm: A Proposal to Regulate Offensive Speech at 
Public University Basketball Games, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 547, 568 (2006) (“[A] university has a 
justifiably substantial interest in protecting children at basketball games from offensive language.”). 
 172. See Jacobs, supra note 171, at 565–66 (“As demonstrated by case law subsequent to 
Cohen, . . . the [u]niversity could regulate on behalf of the privacy interests of those watching the 
game on television or listening to the game on the radio.”). 
 173. Benedict & McMillen, supra note 132, at 24 (“[T]he university could prohibit all signs as 
disruptive and interfering with viewing the event or affecting fan safety.”). 
 174. Jacobs, supra note 171, at 568. 
 175. 390 U.S. 629 (1968). 
 176. Calvert & Richards, supra note 159, at 18. 
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years old did not violate the free expression rights of minors.177  The 
Court recognized that “[t]he well-being of [the State’s] children is of 
course a subject within the State’s constitutional power to regulate.”178  
But obscene material is not protected speech,179 and it is unlikely that the 
profane expression at collegiate sports events rises to the level of 
depicting sexually explicit conduct appealing to the prurient interest of 
minors.180  In Ginsberg, the defendant was charged with selling 
magazines depicting female nudity to minors,181 but rowdy fans at a 
college football game are not holding signs with pornographic images to 
cheer on their teams. 
Proponents’ strongest argument focuses on other Supreme Court 
opinions that demonstrate that the Court has “recognized an interest in 
protecting minors from exposure to vulgar and offensive spoken 
language.”182  In Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica 
Foundation, the Court held that a radio broadcast of satirical humorist 
George Carlin, describing sexual and excretory activities in a “patently 
offensive” manner during a time when children were likely in the 
audience, was vulgar, offensive, and shocking.183  The Court noted that 
because the broadcast media has a “uniquely pervasive presence”184 in 
America, its unique accessibility to children185 and the government’s 
interest in the well-being of its youth justifies the special treatment of 
indecent broadcasting.186  Regulating cheering speech under the premise 
that indecent, offensive, and profane fan expression will be broadcast 
over radio or television and reach children during a time when they are 
“in the audience” would be a possibility.  The question, however, 
becomes, to what extent can fan expression actually be heard and 
understood during a broadcast?  Do the potential lewd and vulgar cheers 
come through as if they were the actual content of the broadcast, or does 
                                                          
 177. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 637. 
 178. Id. at 639. 
 179. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 23 (1973) (“[O]bscene material is unprotected by the First 
Amendment.”); see Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500 (1987) (“‘The First Amendment protects’ 
works which, taken as a whole, have serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value . . . .” 
(quoting Miller, 413 U.S. at 34)). 
 180. See Pope, 481 U.S. at 500–01 (“[T]he first and second prongs of the Miller test—appeal to 
prurient interest and patent offensiveness—are issues of fact for the jury to determine applying 
contemporary community standards.”). 
 181. Ginsberg, 390 U.S. at 631–32. 
 182. See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 684 (1986). 
 183. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 747 (1978). 
 184. Id. at 748. 
 185. Id. at 749. 
 186. Id. at 747–50. 
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the expression become blurred in the background such that only the 
commentators calling the game can be understood? 
Proponents also rely on Justice Powell’s majority opinion in 
Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, where he wrote: “It is well settled that 
a State or municipality can adopt more stringent controls on 
communicative materials available to youths than on those available to 
adults.”187  In Erznoznik, the manager of a drive-in movie theater was 
charged with violating a municipal code for showing a motion picture, 
visible from the public streets, which depicted female nudity.188  But 
Justice Powell also noted that “only in relatively narrow and well-defined 
circumstances may government bar public dissemination of protected 
materials to [minors].”189  The Court found that even if the ordinance was 
aimed at prohibiting youths from viewing sexually explicit films, the 
restriction was broader than permissible because it forbade the display of 
all films containing any form of nudity.190  Justice Powell’s opinion 
continued: “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject to 
some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect 
the young from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable 
for them.”191 
There is little question that collegiate football and basketball venues 
are locations where parents can bring their children for fun and exciting 
family outings.  Many universities even target this demographic by 
offering special ticket packages specifically for families that prefer to sit 
in pre-designated family-friendly areas of the stadium.192  But, by 
allowing lewd, vulgar, and offensive cheering speech to echo throughout 
their sports venues, public universities run the risk of losing this 
demographic of fans who do not want their children exposed to profane 
and indecent expression. 
As Ginsberg, Pacifica, and Erznoznik indicate, the Court has 
recognized a significant interest in protecting the well-being of minors.  
However, even despite this significant interest, the existing government 
regulations on expression at collegiate sporting events are not necessarily 
narrowly drawn to achieve that interest.  Those restrictions that are 
actually content-neutral, such as the complete ban on all signs and 
                                                          
 187. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212 (1975). 
 188. Id. at 206. 
 189. Id. at 213. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id. at 213–14. 
 192. See, e.g., The University of Kansas Official Athletic Site, http://kuathletics.cstv.com/ 
tickets/kan-footbl-season-tix.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009) (describing KU’s Family Plan, which 
“includes two adult and two youth general admission season tickets”). 
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banners at the University of Virginia, serve to eliminate all visual 
messages that a child fan may see, but they do nothing to protect that 
same child from the echoing chants, cheers, and yells—such as 
Maryland’s “Fuck Duke,”193 Kansas’s “Rip His [Fucking] Head Off,”194 
and others—which will remain present within college stadiums and 
arenas.  In fact, the majority of examples in this Comment refer to 
offensive chants and cheers found among student sections across the 
country, not to signs or banners.  Thus, assuming such regulations are 
aimed at protecting the well-being of minors, they ultimately fall short of 
achieving their purpose.  Only an all-out ban on fan expression at college 
sports events could be both content-neutral and designed to protect 
children from exposure to profane, indecent, and vulgar expression.  But 
such a restriction is impractical because it would remove the spirit, pride, 
and excitement that fan participation exudes at collegiate athletic events. 
b. Governmental Interest in Protecting the Privacy Interests of Those 
Watching or Listening from Home 
Proponents further contend that universities have a justifiable interest 
in protecting the privacy interests of an individual watching or listening 
to a collegiate athletics game from his or her home.195  They place 
reliance on the Court’s opinion in Pacifica and Justice O’Connor’s 
majority opinion in Frisby v. Schultz,196 which states: 
One important aspect of residential privacy is protection of the 
unwilling listener.  Although in many locations, we expect individuals 
simply to avoid speech they do not want to hear, the home is different.  
“That we are often ‘captives’ outside the sanctuary of the home and 
subject to objectionable speech . . . does not mean we must be captives 
everywhere.” . . .  Thus, we have repeatedly held that individuals are 
not required to welcome unwanted speech into their own homes and 
that the government may protect this freedom.197 
In Frisby, the City of Brookfield, Wisconsin, enacted an ordinance which 
completely banned picketing within residential areas after a group of 
people strongly opposed to abortion had picketed outside the home of a 
                                                          
 193. Benedict & McMillen, supra note 132, at 5. 
 194. Andy Hyland, Mangino At Center of Drive to Silence Obscene Chant at KU Football 
Games, LAWRENCE J.-WORLD, Oct. 8, 2008, at 1A. 
 195. Jacobs, supra note 171, at 565–66. 
 196. 487 U.S. 474 (1988). 
 197. Id. at 484–85 (citations omitted). 
08.0_KAUFMAN FINAL 4/22/2009  9:02:59 AM 
2009] UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 1265 
doctor known to perform abortions.198  Relying on the Captive Audience 
Doctrine, the Court deemed the doctor to be “figuratively, and perhaps 
literally, trapped within [his] home,”199 and upheld the ban.200 
Proponents of regulating fan expression argue that sports fans 
watching games from home are similarly trapped when unwelcome 
offensive speech is broadcast into their homes.  “To say that one may 
avoid further offense by turning off the radio when he hears indecent 
language is like saying that the remedy for an assault is to run away after 
the first blow. . . .  [B]ut that option does not . . . [allow the listener to] 
avoid a harm that has already taken place.”201 
But college sports fanatics engaging in offensive expression are not 
cheering and chanting on the doorsteps of anyone’s home, and whether 
the rationale in Pacifica applies is to be evaluated upon consideration of 
“a host of variables”: “The time of day, . . . [t]he content of the program 
in which the language is used, . . . and [the] differences between radio 
[and] television.” 202  These variables all favor regulation because sports 
games are broadcast during the day and in prime time when networks can 
attract the most viewers or listeners.  Also, college sports broadcasts 
attract a wide-ranging group of people who tune in to watch a 
competition, not to view offensive material on signs and banners 
displayed in the crowd or listen to offensive language as listeners of a 
George Carlin comedy routine might expect.  Furthermore, the 
differences between television and radio are relevant only to the visual 
aspect of a college athletics broadcast.  The content-neutral restriction on 
signs and banners at the University of Virginia could be justified under 
the privacy of the home rationale because viewers at home would not be 
subject to offensive signs when television camera crews show images of 
the crowd. 
But, as stated above, much of the offensive material present at 
collegiate athletic events comes in the form of cheers and chants, not 
signs and banners, and it may be that the privacy of the home rationale 
would not apply to restrictions on verbal expression.  The game and the 
commentary of the announcers in the booth represent the primary content 
to be broadcast, with the offensive material looming in the background.  
Thus, the policy rationale for protecting the sanctity of the home will 
only apply if the offensive material can be heard and understood when 
                                                          
 198. Id. at 476. 
 199. Id. at 487. 
 200. Id. at 488. 
 201. Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748–49 (1978). 
 202. Id. at 750. 
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broadcast into the homes of unwilling listeners.  But a university has yet 
to impose a content-neutral restriction on verbal fan expression and 
likely will not do so in order to preserve the long-standing tradition of 
school yells and chants that are neither offensive nor indecent. 
c. Governmental Interest in Protecting Fans from Unsafe Environments 
and Viewpoint Obstructions 
Finally, proponents of regulating fan expression effectively argue 
that protecting fans from unsafe and hazardous environments is a 
significant governmental interest justifying content-neutral restrictions 
on speech.203  The University of Mississippi followed this rationale when 
it invoked a restriction on all flags and banners larger than twelve by 
fourteen inches at university athletic events.204  The restriction was 
imposed to prevent injuries from flagsticks and address complaints about 
obstructing the views of other spectators.205  The U.S. District Court that 
presided over a lawsuit over the policy explained that the ban’s purpose 
of safety and control of the spectators within the stadium reflected the 
university’s substantial interest in safe and efficient game 
management.206 
This restriction does not target offensive, vulgar, or indecent visual 
material, but serves to eliminate all forms of visual expression in the 
form of a flag or large sign to protect fans and ensure that everyone has 
the ability to observe the competition.  Fans at the University of 
Mississippi are, however, still permitted to express themselves visually 
by holding a sign that conforms to the restriction, including one of an 
image of a flag or some other message that may be considered offensive.  
However, officials at the University of Virginia trying to rely on a 
similar rationale for their complete ban on signs and banners would face 
challenges that the school’s policy is overbroad.  The school would have 
to justify that all signs and banners, regardless of size, pose either a 
safety risk to other fans or will obstruct the view of other fans. 
In sum, the Court has recognized significant governmental interests 
that may be used by public universities to regulate fan expression at 
school athletic events.  With regard to visual speech (signs, banners, and 
                                                          
 203. Benedict & McMillen, supra note 132, at 24 (“[T]he university could prohibit all signs as 
disruptive and interfering with viewing the event or affecting fan safety.”). 
 204. Barrett v. Khayat, No. CIV.A. 397CV211BA, 1999 WL 33537194, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Nov. 
12, 1999). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at *4. 
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flags), the governmental interests in protecting (1) the well-being of 
minors,207 (2) the privacy interests of those watching from home on 
television,208 and (3) fans from unsafe environments may be and have 
been utilized by public institutions to justify bans on visual expression in 
the stands.  But the verbal-expression issue (chants, cheers, and yells) has 
yet to be addressed by public universities in the form of all-out bans on 
speech.  While schools could constitutionally do so in furtherance of the 
well-being of minors or possibly the privacy interests of those watching 
or listening to games at home, the result would be to silence the stadiums 
and arenas across the country and drastically change the dynamic and 
appeal of the games. 
2. Alternative Channels of Communication 
Even if the government imposes regulations on fan expression that 
are narrowly tailored to further a significant governmental interest, it 
must leave open alternative channels of communication.  For example, 
the University of Mississippi’s ban on all large signs and flags leaves 
fans with the option of bringing smaller signs, including signs with an 
image of the flag.  Fans would also be able to verbally deliver their 
messages, wear their messages on their clothing, or display their flags 
and large signs in the parking lot outside of the stadium.  The University 
of Virginia’s ban on signs and banners leaves fans similar options to 
either express themselves verbally, through their clothing and apparel, or 
outside the stadium before, during, and after the games.  However, 
students at the university found another and more creative channel of 
communication when nearly 5000 students held up eleven by seventeen 
inch sheets of blank, white paper in protest of the school’s anti-sign 
policy.209 
With the exception of expression options outside the stadium, the 
alternative channels available for fan expression inside the stadium are 
also currently at issue.  As discussed above, offensive chanting and 
cheering at collegiate sporting events is arguably a bigger issue than sign 
and banner expression, as student sections across the country have 
adopted the use of profanity to target opposing teams, referees, and 
                                                          
 207. See Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (restricting the rights of minors to 
access obscene materials). 
 208. Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484 (1988); Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n v. Pacifica Found., 
438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978). 
 209. Zach Rowen, Reporting From . . . the UVA Sign-Ban Protest, ESPN THE MAG., 
http://sports.espn.go.com/espnmag/story?id=3575560 (last visited Feb. 25, 2009). 
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others.  Speech through fan apparel is gaining criticism as well, 
prompted by things such as Ohio State students sporting t-shirts reading 
“Ann Arbor is a Whore,”210 Kansas students wearing apparel reading 
“Muck Fizzou,”211 and Missouri students wearing shirts in response that 
display a picture of Lawrence, Kansas, burning in William Quantrill’s 
raid of 1863212—with the word “Scoreboard” and a University of 
Missouri logo appearing immediately below.213 
It is unlikely and virtually impossible for public universities to 
institute bans on verbal and apparel-based expression.  From a historical 
perspective, college sporting events have always had a rich tradition of 
school spirit and fan participation.  School fight songs, yells, and other 
traditions have been around for decades and are a part of the university 
culture.  From a financial perspective, the money to be gained from fans 
purchasing school t-shirts, hats, jackets, and other accessories is immense 
and a complete ban on apparel-based expression would likely result in 
significant profit losses for universities and would not be worth the 
restriction. 
C. Proposals to Solve the “Cheering Speech” Issue that May Pass 
Constitutional Standards  but Fail Public Opinion 
To assist universities in resolving the dispute between expressive 
fans and unwilling listeners, some scholars have proposed “Model 
Regulations”214 for schools across the country to adopt, which they argue 
satisfy constitutional requirements.  The problem, however, is that many 
of these proposals will not pass the test of satisfying public opinion.  
While these calculated restrictions will serve to provide content-neutral 
prohibitions, their practical application at the stadium on game day 
would not be well received. 
For example, one such model policy would rely on the captive 
audience doctrine to enact regulations that prohibit indecent, obscene, 
and profane speech while attending university athletic events.215  The 
proponents argue that because substantial individual privacy interests are 
being invaded by “inappropriate” fan expression, both within homes and 
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at the game, regulation is required.216  The proponents rely on the Court’s 
opinion in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium, 
Inc. v. Federal Communications Commission217 that unwilling listeners 
of public television and radio broadcasts are considered a captive 
audience and, while viewers are free to avert their eyes,218 such an 
argument, according to the Court, “is the equivalent to saying that the 
remedy to an assault is to run away after the first blow.”219 
The proponents further argue that children attending the game are 
similar to the transit passengers in Lehman v. Shaker Heights,220 and the 
students in Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser,221 such that the 
“obscene message engages children who have no means of avoiding the 
conduct.”222  But fans at university sporting events are not a captive 
audience.  Fans have the option to avert their eyes223 from messages they 
do not want to see, listen to the radio broadcast while at the game using 
headphones to dilute the cheers, or simply not go to the game at all. 
Another policy “prohibits all spectators from bringing into any 
athletic arena or stadium any banners, signs, or posters, regardless of 
their content or subject-matter.”224  The policy, however, would allow 
fans to bring and display such banners outside of the sports venues.225  It 
is possible this regulation would pass constitutional muster.  The 
government has a significant interest in protecting student athletes, 
coaches, and referees from verbal abuse and threats as well as children in 
the audience who would otherwise be exposed to potentially offensive 
language.  The all-out ban on all signs is a content-neutral policy, and it 
has left open alternative methods to display such banners and signs, such 
as the parking lot.  But is this regulation narrowly drawn to further the 
interest?  Unfortunately, no.  While the ban on signs and banners 
removes visually offensive material (and other “appropriate” visual 
material) from the confines of the stadium, the auditory offensive 
material in the form of cheers, chants, and yells will remain.  So those 
same classes of people that the state is trying to protect will continue to  
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be exposed to the “inappropriate” material that the regulation is designed 
to prohibit. 
The policy also imposes restrictions on clothes-based expression, 
requiring that spectators who wear any article of clothing at sporting 
events “bearing any words with letters larger in height or width than one 
inch, regardless of the content or subject matter . . . must sit in seats at 
least 25 rows away from the court or playing field.”226  The policy 
rationale is to reduce the likelihood that indecent and profane messages 
are broadcast to a television audience across the country.227  But the 
practical implementation of this content-neutral policy would be 
impossible for stadium officials to enforce and it would also result in 
very few fans with team apparel sitting within the first twenty-five rows 
of the field.  Furthermore, such a restriction would not be in the interests 
of university officials, who would want the name and logo of their 
institution displayed proudly on the shirts and hats of fans throughout the 
stadium, not just rows twenty-five and up.  In 2007, officials at the 
University of Kansas were asked by ESPN television to make an 
announcement asking the students to turn their “Muck Fizzou” shirts 
inside-out during a home basketball game.228  While the KU athletics 
department considered the shirt “distasteful,” it declined to make the 
announcement.229 
D.  An American Solution: More Speech 
An ideal solution to the spectator expression issue facing public 
university administrators would strike an appropriate balance in 
preserving long-standing constitutional rights, while at the same time 
furthering strong governmental interests.  However, to the extent that 
these principles collide and co-existence becomes impossible, it is 
inevitable that one must ultimately yield to the other.  Should sports fans, 
like the KU student with his banner, suffer the loss and be censored from 
expressing their views, many of which contain clean, clever, and often 
truthful statements?  Or should universities acknowledge the commands 
and the restrictions imposed on them by the provisions of the First 
Amendment and work toward seeking other alternatives?  The answer 
must be the latter. 
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A determination that governmental interests—like protecting student 
athletes, coaches, referees, and child spectators from rude, profane, and 
insulting expression—outweigh the constitutional guarantees of free 
speech and expression would itself be unsportsmanlike.  The prohibition 
of all signs and banners, like at the University of Virginia, while a 
content-neutral regulation, is too broad a restriction and fails to 
accomplish its targeted goals.  What about a restriction prohibiting all 
chants and cheers at sports events, whether positive or negative, to 
ensure that all “inappropriate” language is eliminated from speech that 
unwilling listeners would receive?  While these proposals would serve to 
further the governmental interests, they are overbroad restrictions on 
American speech.  The only restrictions on expression that university 
officials should lawfully regulate are those forms of expression the 
Supreme Court has already determined receive no protection: 
defamation, obscenity, fighting words, and illegal advocacy intended to 
incite imminent lawless action. 
The proper solution is a traditional American solution—more speech.  
Ample alternatives exist for athletics officials and university 
administrators to mitigate the negative effects of free expression.  The 
strongest alternative would be to counter negative, profane, and 
unwanted student speech with university approved messages.  The 
university could easily generate such messages through its cheerleaders, 
marching bands, and sound-systems, as well as by creating an official 
student cheering section to help drown out the speech the university 
seeks to eliminate.  Officials at the University of Arkansas have taken 
this approach in encouraging cheerleaders and band members to “help 
dissuade or drown out negative cheers and taunts with their own positive 
cheers and music.”230 
Secondly, a public university has complete authority to zone its 
facilities and determine which groups—students, families, alumni, 
valuable donors, etc.—sit in which sections.  While a complete 
dissolution of the student section at athletic events is an option to 
dissipate unwanted expression, such action would serve to eliminate 
potential home-field advantages schools strive to create.  A better option 
would be to separate the students from the families, minimize exposure, 
and utilize the school marching band by placing it near the students to 
drown out any “inappropriate cheering speech.”  Athletics officials at the  
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University of Illinois have taken such steps by shifting the students and 
band away from the visiting players and fans.231 
Thirdly, many schools have begun appealing to students via pre-
game video announcements from popular and well-respected members of 
the university, such as head coaches.  Such messages may not persuade 
every spectator, but the university has every right and reason to 
encourage sportsmanlike behavior from its fans.  Furthermore, the 
university could target forms of speech such as profanity and sexist, 
racist, or other derogatory language without implicating First 
Amendment protections simply by encouraging students to refrain from 
such behavior.  This option serves as a deterrent and helps to educate 
vocal and passionate fans about preferred conduct while in attendance. 
Finally, universities should consider implementing sportsmanship 
initiatives to promote sportsmanlike behavior and foster a positive, yet 
competitive, game day environment.  The University Daily Kansan, the 
student newspaper at KU, began a campus-wide contest to replace the 
popular, yet offensive “Muck Fizzou” t-shirt.232  Students were 
encouraged to submit design ideas and vote for their favorites online.233  
A KU Associate Athletic Director believed “the contest was a step in the 
right direction,” stating that the athletics department “[thought] the best 
part of this was that it was totally student driven, and that is the way it 
should be.”234  Similarly, students at the University of Maryland created 
a “voluntary compliance policy,” which included a profane t-shirt 
exchange; contests encouraging students to design clever signage; having 
popular athletics representatives address the students about good 
sportsmanship; and distributing lists of “creative witty cheers” for 
students to proclaim at home games.235  In 2004, Maryland State 
University spent over $30,000 on a campus-wide “sportsmanship” 
campaign236 and in 2003, the Big Ten Conference also launched a 
sportsmanship program.237 
                                                          
 231. Id. at 63–64. 
 232. Thor Nystrom, Out with ‘Muck Fizzou,’ Students Vote for the New, U. DAILY KANSAN, Oct. 
25, 2007, at 3A. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Thor Nystrom, Winning Slogans Revealed for Rivalry, Gameday T-Shirts, U. DAILY 
KANSAN, Nov. 12, 2007, at 10A. 
 235. Wasserman, supra note 14, at 390–91. 
 236. Ethan Yale Bordman, Freedom of Speech and Expression in Sports: The Balance Between 
Rights of the Individual and the Best Interest of Sport, 86 MICH. BAR J. 36, 37 (Sept. 2007). 
 237. Calvert & Richards, supra note 159, at 3. 
08.0_KAUFMAN FINAL 4/22/2009  9:02:59 AM 
2009] UNSPORTSMANLIKE CONDUCT 1273 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Collegiate athletics are a source of great pride, loyalty, and school 
spirit for many Americans.  Every week, thousands across the country 
file into the stands, fill the seats, and choose to express their passion for 
the game and their teams in many different ways.  For some, boisterous 
boos, obnoxious chants, and profane messages are the means for fans to 
fully express themselves.  For others, singing the school fight song, 
participating in the traditional school yell, and applauding the team on to 
victory, all while wearing the school colors, is the preferred mode of 
expression.  The First Amendment to the Constitution allows each person 
to freely express himself or herself, even at sporting events, subject to 
government regulations that are content-neutral, further significant 
governmental interests, and leave open alternatives modes of 
communication. 
Despite the constitutional ability of schools to regulate speech to 
protect players, coaches, referees, and child spectators from 
“inappropriate” remarks during games using content-neutral restrictions, 
universities should look to other alternatives.  Restrictions on such 
speech cannot be viewpoint based.  Thus, to achieve the desired result of 
no indecent, vulgar, or profane language at college sports events, 
universities must impose overbroad policies that will censor even the 
most humorous, clever, and even truthful expression about the game, 
players, teams, or schools.  The proper remedy to combat negative 
speech is more speech.  Schools have ample resources to counter 
“inappropriate speech” by creating positive cheers and chants, 
implementing sportsmanship initiative programs, zoning their stadiums, 
and appealing to students through well-respected members of the school 
or community and encouraging all fans to act with class.  To do 
otherwise would be unsportsmanlike. 
 
